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Abstract:
Regulating an export firm (or a homogeneous industry) with private information about
emission technology is analysed, when the firm, owned partly by foreigners, has an option to
bypass domestic regulation through costly relocation. If the firm chooses to relocate, it will
set up a new plant in a region practicing environmental dumping, at a cost that is correlated
with emission efficiency, so as to make the firm’s reservation utility type-dependent. We
characterise the set of optimal contracts offered by the uninformed, domestic government
under different ownership structures, when domestic taxation is distortive, and when welfare
is the sum of consumers’ surplus and the share of the firm’s rent accruing to domestic
residents. With complete information, ownership has no real effects. When information is
incomplete, ownership matters, due to rent extraction, being of greater significance when
ownership rights are shifted towards foreigners. Rent extraction is accomplished by offering
contracts with lower output and higher net emissions to a subset of the most efficient types
(being induced to stay), whereas a subset of the least efficient types should be induced to
relocate. A demand for environmental dumping is being induced by the domestic
government’s concern for national interests. When barriers towards foreign ownership are
lowered, and then shifting the distribution of ownership rights in the favour of foreigners,
more pollution will be generated for types of the firm that do not exit, whereas a larger
fraction of the firm types should be induced to relocate.
Keywords: Asymmetric information, environmental regulation, foreign ownership.
JEL classification: D62, D82, H23, L51
1) I am grateful to F.R.Førsund, S.Strøm, K.Sydsæter and two referees for suggestions to
improve the paper.
11. Introduction
It is said that we live in the age of globalisation, featuring e.g., higher capital
mobility, more intense international tax competition and fewer restrictions on
foreign ownership to firms located in various regions. These changes are expected
to have some impact on the economic and political environment of national
governments. When unilateral actions taken by a government could have some
desired effects in earlier periods, such actions cannot longer be taken without
recognising the potential counteractions taken either by affected parties or by
other governments so as to leave affected parties with new sets of options.
(Attempts at taxing highly mobile factors of production are often met by owners
of these factors threatening to move to regions or jurisdictions where more
favourable tax rules are offered.) The literature on international tax competition in
the field of environmental regulation has focused on various issues within this
area. For instance, there is one branch discussing the impact of domestic
environmental policy on delocation of plants, within an imperfectly competitive
environment and complete information, taking foreign environmental policies as
given; see e.g. Markusen et al. (1993), and Motta and Thisse (1994). In another
branch, the impact of environmental policies on plant location is analysed within a
multi-country, multi-firm, complete information framework where governments
play a non-cooperative game with domestic environmental instruments (pollution
taxes or standards) as strategic variables; see e.g. Markusen et al. (1995),
Rauscher (1995) and Hoel (1997). In a broad sense these papers try to reach some
qualitative conclusions as to whether strategic uncertainty and interjurisdictional
tax competition will lead to a too lax or too strict domestic environmental policy.
Another line of reasearch has focused on the impact of incomplete or asymmetric
information on the design of environmental policy, see e.g. Roberts and Spence
(1976), Kwerel (1977), Baron (1985), Spulber (1988), Laffont (1994), van
Egteren (1996), Lewis (1996), and Mansouri and Youssef (2000). The main
insight from this literature is that privately informed agents will have to be offered
a rent for revealing their private information. Leaving rent is normally socially
costly; hence the policy designer or regulator will find it desirable to extract these
rents, which will be accomplished by imposing some allocative distortions. The
direction of these distortions, especially how domestic pollution should be
2distorted relative to complete information, will depend on how pollution and rent
interact.
The purpose of the present paper is to bring together elements from these lines of
reasearch. We want to analyse environmental regulation under incomplete
information within the following context: There is one firm located in some
country. This firm is harming the local environment through its pollution, which is
a by-product of the production of some commodity, produced solely for export.
We assume that the firm is owned (partly) by foreigners, and has an option to
bypass domestic regulation by closing down domestic plants and instead set up a
new plant within a jurisdiction with no environmental regulation. There is no
explicit interjurisdictional tax competition, as we take the loose environmental
policy abroad as given. The main issue is to analyse the impact of foreign
ownership to the polluting firm on domestic environmental policy under
incomplete information and an exit or relocation option. The answer will of
course depend on the domestic government’s objective function. In the present
framework we assume that the government only takes national welfare into
account, by maximising the sum of domestic consumers’ surplus (or taxpayers’
surplus), net of environmental damage, and rent accruing to domestic owners of
the firm. In that case, the weight put on rent will vary with foreign ownership
share. (Laffont (1996) has, within a political economy model of regulation,
demonstrated that ownership will have a similar impact on the regulation of a
natural monopoly. The role of ownership of polluting firms is to a large extent
ignored in the literature. However, Hoel (op.cit.) is an exception. He shows,
within a setting different from the one here, that distribution of ownership will
have some impact on domestic environmental policy. One implication of his
model that is relevant here, is that the socially optimal emission tax rate (under
complete information) will be higher - inducing lower emissions - the larger is the
share of profits that accrue to residents outside the common jurisdiction. In this
paper we get a result which partly goes in the opposite direction: higher foreign
ownership share and incomplete infomation might lead to higher emissions for the
firm types that do not relocate, but induced relocation becomes more likely.)
To get some insight into the complex interaction between domestic environmental
regulation, incomplete information, the role of ownership and the issue of
3relocation, we set up a simple model, having one exporting firm located in a home
country. Along with output, gross emissions (primary discharges) are produced in
fixed proportions to output, with the factor of proportionality taken as a measure
of the effectiveness of the installed emission technology, which is private
information to the firm. Even though we assume a fixed relationship between
primary discharges and output, this relationship can be modified as the firm is
able to undertake non-verifiable pollution abatement. The government wants to
impose policy rules so as to get the firm to take account of the costs of pollution.
However, the firm’s private information impedes the regulator from evaluating
correctly the costs and benefits from continued production at home. In addition,
the domestic government has to take into account the firm’s option to relocate by
incurring a set-up cost that is higher the more effective is the firm’s emission
technology. (This assumption is justified below.) Hence, the firm’s reservation
utility or participation constraint will be type-dependent. (See e.g. Laffont and
Tirole (1990), Maggi and Rodríguez-Clare (1995), Curien et al. (1998) and Jullien
(2000) for more on principal-agent models with type-dependent reservation
utility.) The distribution of ownership rights between foreign and own residents is
taken as an exogenous parameter. Because the government is concerned only
about own residents’ welfare, the weight put on rent in the welfare function is
lower the higher is foreign ownership share. Under complete information, we
show in section 2 that under if no relocation is socially desirable, ownership has
no impact on the policy rules, only maximal domestic welfare will be affected
negatively by foreigners’ ownership share. On the other hand, we show in section
3 that under incomplete information, distribution of ownership rights will have an
impact both on the policy rules, the level of expected welfare, as well as those
types of the firm that should be induced to relocate. This is a robust result in the
sense that it does not hinge on domestic taxation being distortionary. In section 4
we consider how the environmental policy and expected pollution will be affected
by a redistribution of ownership rights. If foreign ownership share increases, rent
extraction becomes more important, implying that relocation becomes more likely
with net emissions being higher for those types of the firm that should be induced
to stay. Hence the impact on expected local pollution from a higher foreign
ownership share is ambiguous. Section 5 concludes.
42. The model
We consider a rather simple model consisting of one polluting firm, located in a
”home” country, while selling its output solely in a foreign market. By
assumption, the firm is owned partly by domestic residents, with an exogenous
ownership share, denoted α ∈ [0, 1]. Net revenue from exporting y units of the
output is given by π(y), which by assumption is strictly concave, with π(0) = 0,
and a unique maximum for y~ > 0. Along with output, an amount of primary
discharges (”gross emission”) yθ  is produced, where θ is a one-dimensional
technology parameter, known only by the firm. The smaller value θ takes the
cleaner is the emission technology, as the level of emissions (prior to abatement)
per unit output is smaller. (Later we consider a closed type space Θ = [ θθ , ].)
Net emissions (x) will be equal to the difference between the amount of primary
discharges or gross pollution, θy, and pollution abatement, xyA −=θ . Although
we assume a fixed type-dependent relationship between the level of output and
primary discharges, the relationship between output and the level of externality
(net emissions or pollution) can be modified through costly (and unverifiable)
pollution abatement. Let the (unverifiable) cost of abatement be v(A); which is
thrice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing in A for any A > 0, with
000 =′= )(v)(v , and strictly convex for any 0≥A . (In addition we assume
)(Av ′′′  ≥ 0.)
Social damage or domestic environmental cost caused by net emissions is D(x).
The damage is purely local. D(x) is assumed to be twice continuously
differentiable, strictly increasing for any x > 0, with 000 =′= )(D)(D , and
strictly convex for any 0≥x .
As will be obvious, the firm should be made responsible for its damage on the
local environment. However, if the owners of the firm should find the domestic
regulation too unfavourable, the firm might either shut down or, if possible,
relocate. To capture the relocation issue, we have to specify the firm’s options.
Suppose that if the firm relocates, it will move to a region with no environmental
regulation, and will here be able to capture the maximal profit )y~(π , by incurring
some exit or relocation cost. For ease of exposition we let exit cost depend on the
type parameter θ. (We then avoid technical problems related to a multi-
5dimensional type space, as being analysed by Armstrong (1999) and Armstrong
and Rochet (1999).) Next, we suppose that the exit cost is negatively correlated
with the type parameter .θ  This assumption can be justified by thinking of a clean
firm (one with a low θ ) makes intensively use of specific factors not required by
a firm with a dirty technology. Hence, the cost of switching location is therefore
non-increasing in θ. In addition the exit cost )(θc  is twice continuously
differentiable, with 0)( ≤′ θc . (Note that if we should have imposed 0)( >′ θc ,
then we would face some additional technical problems, due to countervailing
incentives, as analysed by Lewis and Sappington (1989), Maggi and Rodríguez-
Clare (op.cit.) and Jullien (op.cit.). Our assumption about the set-up cost helps
reducing the equilibrium set, and the exclusion issue can be analysed by using
standard techniques.)
When complying with domestic environmental regulation and taxation, the firm’s
rent, when producing y units of the final output for export, is
(1)   TxyvyU in −−−= )()( θπ
with T being taxes paid to the domestic government. In this case, the consumers’
or tax-payers’ surplus will consist of the social value of tax revenue minus the
social cost due to local pollution D(x). Because we rule out lump-sum taxation,
any tax revenue collected from the firm has a social value equal to (1 + m)T,
where m is the marginal cost of public funds. Hence, in this case consumers’
surplus is
(2) )x(DT)m(CS in −+= 1
If on the other hand the firm relocates, it will capture a rent, net of exit costs
(3) ),y~(R:)(c)y~(U out θθπ =−=
but now the domestic government has no power to tax the firm. (Note that the
firm’s reservation utility ),y~(R θ  is type-dependent and non-decreasing in θ by
6assumption.) However, there is a gain from relocation because the local cost of
pollution will vanish altogether; hence .0=outCS
Let the welfare measure be the sum of consumers’ surplus and the domestic share
of the firm’s rent; hence we define W = CS + αU. Furthermore, define the ”tax-
adjusted” welfare weight put on rent as γ := 1 + m − α > 0.
When information is complete, maximal welfare, denoted ,*W  is determined as
the solution to the following problem
(4)       [ ]{ }),y~(RUU)y,x,(Smax),,y~(RmaxW U,y,x* θγθθα ≥−=
when we have used that [ ] )x(D)xy(v)y()m()y,x,(S −−−+= θπθ 1  is the
social surplus generated by the firm’s domestic activity. If the firm should
relocate, welfare is equal to the domestic share of rent captured abroad, but if the
firm continues its operations at home, welfare is equal to the maximised net
surplus, with the firm being offered a rent at least as high as its outside option. (In
the optimal solution this constraint will be binding, because leaving a too high
rent will reduce welfare.)
Let us now make an assumption that makes ”no relocation” part of the optimal
solution under complete information:
There exists a pair ( ** , yx ), with ),0( ** yx θ∈  and )y~,y(y c* ∈  so that for any
Θ∈θ , ),y~(R),y~(R)y,x,(S)(W *** θαθγθθ >−= , or equivalently,
(5)        )y()y~(
m
)x(D)xy(v)(c *
*
** ππθθ −>
+
−−−
1
This requirement says that there exist some net emission and some output level so
that social welfare from having the firm operating at home is higher than welfare
if the firm should relocate. (We have also restricted first-best output to be in the
interval )y~,y( c , where the lower bound cy  solves 0=′ )y( cΠ , where
)y(y:)y( πΠ ′=  is strictly concave and 0≥)y(Π for any [ ]y~,y 0∈ . Hence, by
assumption we have 0<′′+′=′ )y(y)y()y( **** ππΠ .)
7Because ),,( yxS θ  is strictly concave in (x, y), it is easy to see that under complete
information, we have the following result:
Proposition 1
Given our assumptions, first-best allocation (x*, y*, U*, W*) is characterized by:
(6-i) 0)()1()( *** =−′++′− xyvmxD θ
(6-ii) 0)()( *** =−′−′ xyvy θθπ
(6-iii) ),y~(RU * θ=
(6-iv) ),y~(R)y,x,(S)(W *** θγθθ −=
Optimal net emissions, x*, should equate marginal damage to social marginal cost
of abatement (i.e. cost efficiency), whereas output exported y*, which is below the
unregulated level y~ , should maximise net profits; i.e. revenue extraction. (Given
our assumptions, it can easily be verified that the first-best emission profile )(* θx
is strictly increasing in ,θ  whereas first-best output )(y* θ  is strictly declining in
.θ  (From (6i-ii) we get [ ] 011 <′′+′′′+′′+′+−= vyv(Dv)m(v)m(
d
)(dy* θ
∆θ
θ  and
[ ] 01 >′′+′+−= ππ
∆θ
θ y)m(
d
)(dx* . These signs follow directly from our
assumptions with [ ] [ ] 011 22 >′′+′′−′′−′′′′+=−= ππθ∆ )m(v)v(D)m(SSS xyyyxx
because S is strictly concave in (x, y).)
No rent above the outside option should be left to the firm, saying that profits
above the reservation level should be taxed away. But when the domestic
regulator or government has the power to tax away any rent in excess of the
outside option, first-best allocation (x*, y*) is unaffected by ownership structure,
whereas maximal social welfare will be higher the higher is the domestic
ownership share α. (We also note that the more distortive is domestic taxation, so
that the cost of raising tax revenues, m, becomes higher, will make both x* and y*
higher.) Maximal social welfare under complete information )(* θW , which by
assumption is higher when the firm is complying with domestic regulation rather
8than moving abroad, will vary with the type of the firm. Due to our assumption
about the exit cost, )(* θW  will be declining in θ, as seen from
(7) )(c)xy(vy)m(),y
~(R)y,x,(S)(W *****
*
θγθ
θ
θγθ
θ
θ
θ ′+−′+−=∂
∂
−=
∂
∂ 1
This feature of the solution will have the following implication: When leaving the
assumption of complete information, we know that some types of the firm will
have to be offered a rent as a compensation for revealing their true type. To
reduce this incentive, the regulator will normally distort (x, y) away from their
first-best values so as to reduce the firm’s scope for profitable misrepresentation,
implying that welfare is reduced below W* for any type of the firm. For that
reason, social welfare might be higher by inducing some of the dirty types of the
firm to relocate. (Jebjerg and Lando (1997) analyse the possibility of shutdown of
heavy polluters, within a model close to the present one, but with fixed output and
no outside option.)
The first-best solution can be implemented in various ways under complete
information; one is through a two-part emission tax, as given by
,t
m
)x(D)x(t 01
+
+
=  where the fixed part is type-dependent obeying
),y~(R
m
)y,x,(S),y~(R
m
)x(D)xy(v)y(t
***
*** θθθθπ −
+
=−
+
−−−=
110
. When
facing this tax schedule, the firm will produce and pollute according to (6i-ii) and
obtain a rent exactly equal to the outside option.
Let us have this first-best solution in mind as a benchmark when turning to
asymmetric information about the emission technology. Our main focus is to see
how environmental regulation will be affected by private information about the
emission technology, as given by the parameter θ, as well as how regulation is
affected by different ownerhip regimes, when the firm has an outside option as
given in (3).
93. Optimal regulation under asymmetric information
Consider now a more realistic situation where the firm is privately informed about
the technology parameter θ. To deal with this problem, we make use of recent
developments in the theory of incentive regulation, which, according to several
authors seems to be particularly appropriate. For instance, Lewis (op.cit. p.820)
says: ”The application of incentive regulation to environmental protection is
particularly appropriate because the regulator is often quite uninformed about the
private benefits citizens enjoy from improved environmental conditions and the
costs producers and consumers bear to reduce pollution.”
The new economics of regulation have offered insight into the issue of how to
regulate privately informed firms. To see what kind of modification that is
required to cope with private information, let us first see what the outcome would
be if the privately informed firm were to be offered the tax schedule implementing
the first-best solution in Proposition 1. It should be rather obvious that any type of
the firm in that case would pretend to have the “worst” technology (θ ). If a θ-
firm, ∈θ [ θθ , ), should claim to have the least efficient emission technology and
then undertake pollution abatement so as to emit )(x* θ , the firm will obtain a
rent as given by
(8) [ ] )(t
m
))(x(D))(xy(v)y(Max),(u
*
*
y θ
θθθπθθ 01
−
+
−−−=
Let [ ])xy(v)y(Max)x,(V y −−= θπθ , so that )xy(vy)x,(V −′−= θθθ . Then
we can rewrite (8), when inserting for the fixed fee ),(t θ0  to get:
    [ ] −=−−=
θ
θ
θθθθθθθθ dz)x,z(V),y~(R))(x,(V))(x,(V),y~(R),(u z**
(8)’
)(x:xfor),y~(Rmax),y~(R * θθθ Θθ ==> ∈
Hence: The first-best policy of Proposition 1 cannot be implemented through a
two-part emission tax when the firm has private information about its emission
technology. If the government should impose the emission tax schedule t(x),
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expected net emissions will become too high and expected rent given away will
be too generous, as this tax scheme will not lead to separation among types. We
therefore have to look for an incentive compatible mechanism, i.e. one that
motivates the firm to reveal its private information.
To see the full impact of private information, we’ll assume that output, as well as
net emissions and taxes paid by the firm can be verified, and written into a
regulatory contract. However, neither abatement nor abatement cost (say, due to
accounting manipulation) can be verified. Therefore, the regulatory problem
becomes very similar to multiproduct regulation as analysed in chapter 3 by
Laffont and Tirole (1993). (One might dispute the assumption that both output
and net emissions can be verified. What can be made part of a contract will vary
from case to case; sometimes only the use of externality-generating inputs can be
verified, while in others only net emissions can be verified. However, one
justification for our assumption is that we then get a model being ”very close” to
our benchmark model, making it possible to see the impact of asymmetric
information alone. In Vislie (2001), it is assumed that only net emissions can be
verified, and it is shown that the distortions in net emissions, relative to first best,
can go either way, depending on the firm’s market power in the foreign market.)
The main purpose here is to analyse whether foreign ownership will have any
impact on optimal regulation under incomplete information, when the firm has an
option to relocate. To get some insight into this issue, we restrict attention to one-
period regulation, which is of course a bit unrealistic. However, the insight
obtained might be of some help when turning to more complex cases.
We have by assumption a single government agency who is delegated the
authority to regulate the firm’s output and net emissions. The regulator does not
know the type of the firm, but has prior beliefs, which are common knowledge,
given by the strictly increasing and twice continuously differentiable cumulative
distribution function F(θ ), so that the density f(θ) is strictly positive on the fixed
support Θ = [ θθ , ]. The distribution is assumed to satisfy the ”monotone hazard
rate property” so that 
)(
)(
θ
θ
f
F  is non-decreasing in θ, ∀θ∈Θ. The regulator knows
that the firm will take advantage of its private information so as to capture a
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socially costly informational rent. To counteract the incentive for misrepresenting
type, the regulator will, as is now well known, design contract rules that will make
it socially desirable to deviate from ordinary allocative efficiency or trade off rent
extraction and allocative inefficiencies. The regulator’s problem is then to choose
in the class of truth-telling mechanisms, as well as types of the firm that should be
induced to relocate, the set of contracts that will maximise expected welfare. (In
Appendix A, we have derived first- and second-order conditions ensuring that
revealing information truthfully is optimal for the firm.)
Because of the properties of the first-best solution, as stated in the two conditions
(5) and (7), we noted that if some types of the firm should be induced to relocate,
these types are expected to be in the upper part of the set Θ. Hence, a priori we
can divide Θ into two disjoint sets; Ξ and Σ, where Ξ is the set of firm types that
will continue operations at home, whereas Σ is the set of types that will be
induced to relocate. When deriving the optimal solution, we take advantage of this
a priori information. Therefore, the upper bound (or ”cut-off”-type) in the set
[ ] ΘξθΞ ⊆= ,  is to be determined as part of the problem.
The regulator’s problem can therefore be stated as choosing the set of
participating types (Ξ), their net emissions as well as output exported, so as to
maximise expected welfare subject to the incentive constraints and the type-
dependent participation constraint:
[RP]
Max {x, y, ξ} [ ]








+− 
θ
ξ
ξ
θ
θθθαθθθγθθθ d)(f),y~(Rd)(f)(U))(y),(x,(S
so that [ ]ξθΞθ ,=∈∀ , and Θξ∈
))(x)(y(v)(y)(U θθθθθ −′⋅−= (IC1)
[ ] 0≥⋅′′+′−⋅′′⋅
θ
θθθ
θ
θθ
d
)(dyv)(yv
d
)(dxv)(y (IC2)
),y~(R)(U θθ ≥ (PC)
with [ ] )x(D)xy(v)y()m()y,x,(S −−−+= θπθ 1
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(The first integral in the objective function is the expected net surplus generated
for those types that do not relocate, whereas the second integral is the domestic
share of the expected value of the type-dependent outside option captured by
types that relocate.) The solution to this problem is found in Appendix B; here we
just state the main result, when assuming the optimal cut-off type being in the
interior of Θ:
Proposition 2
Optimal regulation under incomplete information, as given by
{ }0000 ξθθθ ),(U),(y),(x  is characterised by:
0119 000000 =−′′−++−′++′−− )xy(vy
)(f
)(F)m()xy(v)m()x(D)i( θ
θ
θ
αθ
[ ] 0
1
19 00000000 =−′′+−′
+
−+
−−′−′− )xy(vy)xy(v
)(f
)(F
m
m)xy(v)y()ii( θθθ
θ
θαθθπ
θθθθθξθ
ξ
θ
~d))~(x)~(y~(v)~(y),y~(R)(U)iii(  −′+=−
0
000009
[ ] 019 000000000000 =′−−′⋅−+−− )(c))(x)(y(v)(y)(F)m()(f)(W)iv( ξξξξξξαξξ
for ),( θθξ ∈0 , where ),y~(R)m())(y),(x,(S:)(W 00000000 1 ξξξξξ +−=  and S
defined above.
With distortive domestic taxation, and a fixed foreign ownership share, the
conditions (9i-ii) reflect the familiar trade-off between allocative inefficiencies
and rent extraction. To reduce rent for types in Ξ, the regulator will induce higher
net emissions (for any given output level) and lower output (for any fixed net
emission), less efficient than the −θ type, relative to complete information. This
seems reasonable, because these distortions will make it less profitable for a clean
firm to pretend to have a more dirty technology. (The slope of the rent function,
)xy(vy)(U −′=− θθ , is made smaller either by lowering output y and/or by
inducing less pollution abatement A = θ y − x, relative to complete information.
When less output is produced and sold abroad, domestic pollution is automatically
13
reduced if abatement were kept unchanged. However, in order to reduce rent, not
only output y should be reduced, but abatement 000 xyA −=θ  as well.
Condition (9-i) provides a second-best optimality rule for net emissions (or
induced pollution abatement). Social marginal benefit from pollution abatement
should be equal to the modified social marginal cost of abatement, when account
is taken for the marginal impact of abatement on the social value of inframarginal
rent. (9-ii) provides the optimality rule for output exported. For any type of the
firm, output exported should balance the social value of marginal (net) profit,
)xy(v)y( −′−′ θθπ , and the marginal impact of output on the social value of
inframarginal rent.
These distortions will have an impact only for those types of the firm that should
be induced to stay. Because the efficient types of the firm have to be offered a rent
for revealing their private information, above what they could have achieved by
bypassing domestic regulation through relocation, it might be socially desirable to
get some of the inefficient types to relocate. As output and pollution now will
deviate from those under complete information, )(W)(W * θθ <0  for any Ξθ∈ .
Furthermore, due to private information, any firm with type [ )0ξθθ ,∈  will earn a
rent above the minimal rent offered under complete information ),y~(R θ . Hence,
even though we assumed that ),y~(R),y~(R))(y),(x,(S ** θαθγθθθ >−  for any
Θθ ∈  under complete information, making full participation part of the social
optimum, this property will normally not carry over to incomplete information.
The condition (9-iv) gives a precise condition for the partition of Θ into the two
sets Ξ and Σ: On expanding the set Ξ  from [ ]ξθ ,  to [ ]ξ∆ξθ +, , we include
ξ∆ξ )(f  more firms in Ξ. (Note that pollution and output will be adjusted
according to (9i-ii); hence the marginal impact of these adjustments will vanish.)
The corresponding increase in net surplus is then to be given as
[ ] ξ∆ξξγξξξ )(f),y~(R))(y),(x,(S −00 , which has to be balanced against the
cost of increasing the participation set Ξ . First, there is a direct (expected) loss
because we give up the domestic share of net profits these ξ∆ξ )(f  firms could
make from relocating, as given by ξ∆ξξα )(f),y~(R . In addition, rent to
inframarginal firms, in number )(F ξ , has to be increased, both directly and
indirectly. The direct effect follows from the ordinary increase in rent for all
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inframarginal types when increasing the set Ξ , for a fixed end-point constraint on
U, whereas the indirect effect follows from the increasing outside option. (The
marginal type will therefore require a higher rent.) Hence, rent will increase by
ξ∆ξ
ξξξ 





∂
∂
+−
),y~(R)(U)(F  . The social cost of the additional rent is therefore
[ ] ξ∆ξξξγ )(c)(U)(F ′−−  . For the marginal type, 0ξ  in the interior of Θ , the
marginal net surplus is equal to marginal cost, as shown in (9-iv).
Before discussing how increased foreign ownership might affect optimal
regulation under incomplete information, let us make some remarks about the
solution in Proposition 2.
Remark 1
Foreign ownership matters for optimal regulation under incomplete information.
Even if domestic taxation is non-distortive (m = 0), foreign ownership will make
some distortions from first-best efficiency, socially desirable.
(A similar result, but within a model with a different emission technology, has
been derived by Baron (1985). In his model the domestic firm’s profit is given a
weight 1≤α  in the social welfare function, when taxation is non-distortionary.
There will be no distortions if α = 1, as will also be the case in the present model
with m = 0 and α = 1. On the other hand, if α < 1, Baron shows that rent
extraction is an issue, and distortions should be induced. This was also seen to be
the case within the present model, as noted in Remark 1.)
Remark 2
Expected domestic damage, relative to complete information, will under
incomplete information and foreign ownership either increase (if the setΣ is
empty or ”almost” empty) or decrease (if a the mass of firms being induced to
move is large). A closer look at (9-iv) will show that the faster the outside option
is increasing and/or the higher is foreign ownership share, the larger is the
fraction of firms that will relocate.
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Environmental regulation under incomplete information and foreign ownership,
will (sometimes) make it desirable to get the most dirty types to relocate, while at
the same time distort net emissions upwards for the remaining types. Hence what
we can say is that expected domestic pollution (and hence expected domestic
damage), conditional on output, can go either way, as compared to complete
information. What can be said, although this is not important as long as we restrict
pollution to be domestic or local, is that total expected net emissions will increase,
because the firm types that move will produce more, as 0yyy~ * >> , and will not
be forced to undertake any pollution abatement. (The expected increase in
emissions might cause a smaller increase in environmental damage in the new
region than what might be the case in the “home country”.)
Remark 3
If the optimal solution under incomplete information can be implemented by a
non-linear tax T(x, y), the Pigovian part of that tax should be reduced below what
would be the case under complete information, whereas the output tax should be
increased. The marginal pollution tax will for any (x, y), be lower the higher is
foreign ownership share, but the marginal tax on output will, for any (x, y), be
higher the higher is foreign ownership share ( α−1 ); cf. (10).
This remark is related to implementation of the second-best solution. This
problem is not an easy one within a multi-output context, as summarised by Lewis
(op.cit. p 830), who says: ”Unfortunately, though, stringent monotonicity and
curvature conditions are required for the implementation of this [optimal] scheme.
And even if the procedure is implementable, it requires the regulator to design a
different set of prices and taxes for each conceivable type…”. In their Proposition
3.2, Laffont & Tirole (op.cit.) offer sufficient conditions for when an optimal
multi-output regulatory mechanism can be implemented through a menu of linear
contracts. These conditions are not satisfied in the present model. However, rather
than looking at implementation through a menu of linear contracts, we briefly
consider how the optimal solution might be implemented by using ”ordinary” tax
instruments, following Laffont (1994). We might impose a combined non-linear
pollution-output tax )y,x(T , derived from using the information embodied in (9i-
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iv) in Proposition 2. First, this tax schedule has to obey a boundary condition so
that the marginal (or the cut-off) type, 0ξ , earns a rent exactly equal to its outside
option. Secondly, the tax scheme should be designed so that no type in the set Σ
will find it profitable to stick to its present location. Third, if the regulator offers a
tax scheme with a marginal pollution (or Pigovian) tax and a marginal output tax,
both personalised, of the following kind,
(10)
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any firm in the set Ξ will on maximising after-tax rent, in principle (if
monotonicity and curvature conditions are satisfied, so that T(x,y) is convex), be
motivated to take actions in accordance with the second-best allocation in
Proposition 2.
4. The impact of increased foreign ownership
We have seen that under incomplete information ownership matters. As has been
noted in section 2, foreign ownership has an impact only on domestic welfare, not
on pollution and output, when information is complete. However, with incomplete
information, we saw in section 3 that foreign ownership will have an impact not
only on expected welfare, but also on net emissions and output. The reason is that
under incomplete information, rent extraction becomes important with the cost of
giving away rent being higher the higher is foreign ownership share ( α−1 ).
In this section we examine briefly the impact on environmental regulation from
relaxing any restrictions on foreign ownership to firms. The reason for taking up
this problem is the popular view that we now live in the age of globalisation, with
high capital mobility and fewer restrictions on foreign ownership. Hence, we
expect that this kind of deregulation will have some real effects. As long as the
national government puts weight on profits or rents accruing to own residents, a
change in ownership structure, modelled as a declining α , will have an impact on
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the policy rules, and hence on resource allocation, implicitly determined by the
conditions in Proposition 2.
As demonstrated in Appendix C, the cut-off type will have a more efficient
emission technology the higher is ( α−1 ). Hence, the likelihood for relocation is
increasing with foreign ownership, or put another way, interjurisdictional firm
mobility will increase. Furthermore, when ( α−1 ) increases, the cost of leaving
rent (as measured by the parameter γ) will increase as well. To mitigate this effect,
the government will be more concerned about rent extraction by getting the firm
to increase net emissions (through a lower marginal pollution tax) and reduce
output, for any ( ]0ξθθ ,∈ . (Due to these changes in x and y, rent will be lowered
for any type in the participation set; see Appendix C for details.) We can therefore
conclude with:
Proposition 3
Under incomplete information, increased foreign ownership makes rent extraction
more important. The optimal response by the domestic government to increased
foreign ownership is to induce a reduction in the participation set (Ξ ), a
reduction in output exported and an increase in net emissions.
If foreigners, due to some global deregulation, can more easily buy ownership
rights to locally polluting firms, we have found that environmental policy will be
changed, with an ambiguous impact on domestic environment. There are two
opposing effects due to lower barriers to foreign ownership: First, because rent
extraction becomes more important, more pollution should be induced for firm
types not being induced to relocate. Secondly, for fixed net emissions, the fraction
of firm types that should be induced to stick to the original location should be
reduced, because the cost of leaving rent gets higher. This effect will push
towards reduced expected local damage, whereas the first one pushes towards
higher local pollution. Hence, the impact on expected local pollution is ambiguous
within the present framework.
Another implication of “lower barriers to foreign ownership” (or higher capital
mobility in a broad sense) is the unintentional impact on interjurisdictional firm
mobility. When autonomous, but less informed, governments, pursue their goal of
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maximising expected national welfare through a proper design of domestic
environmental policy, they will demand the services offered by countries
practicing environmental dumping. Hence, when some country is pursuing a strict
environmental policy, so as to meet its national goal, the fact that some other
country is practicing environmental dumping so as to attract foreign investments
might be mutually beneficial.
5. Conclusion
We have analysed a standard model for regulating an exporting firm producing a
negative local externality under incomplete information. Not surprisingly we have
seen that incomplete information and distortive domestic taxation will make some
distortions from first best socially desirable, because rent extraction now is an
issue. In addition to demonstrating the optimal trade-off between allocative
inefficiencies and rent extraction, one goal of the paper has been to analyse the
impact on second-best optimality of changing the ownership regime, by relaxing
barriers to foreign ownership control. (This is one among many features of
globalisation.) Because informational rent to domestic owners enters the welfare
function, an increasing share of foreign owners will increase the welfare cost of
rent. Giving away too high rent will under a distortionary tax system be socially
undesirable; hence a higher foreign ownership share will increase the
government’s incentive to extract rent. Rent extraction is in the model
accomplished by inducing the firm not only to reduce output and reduce pollution
abatement, relative to complete information, but also to get a subset of the least
efficient firm types to relocate to other regions. (This feature of the model is a
consequence of the assumption about the relationship between outside option and
emission efficiency.) One might say that the home government takes advantage of
other countries practicing environmental dumping.
When a larger fraction of the firm is under foreigners’ control, then, according to
the domestic government’s policy rules, an upwards adjustment in net emissions
and a downwards adjustment in output will be triggered, along with inducing a
larger fraction of the firm types to relocate. The reason for this adjustment is that
rent extraction becomes more important, when foreigners’ ownership share gets
higher. For a fixed pattern of location, expected local pollution will, according to
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our assumptions, increase, but this effect is counteracted by the government’s
desire to extract rent by getting a subset of the least efficient types to relocate.
Hence, lower barriers to foreign ownership will not necessarily lead to higher
local pollution.
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Appendix A
• Incentive compatible mechanisms
According to the revelation principle, any regulatory scheme can be represented
by a direct revelation mechanism, where the firm is asked to report its type. The
regulator is, by assumption, able to design (and commit to) a mechanism so as to
induce truthtelling. Within the present context, where both output (y) and level of
pollution or net emissions (x), along with taxes (T), can be verified, a truth-telling
mechanism can formally be represented by a triple, which specifies a transfer, a
required output level and net emissions for any report θˆ ∈Θ of the firm’s type
{T(θˆ ), y(θˆ ), x(θˆ )}. Let the set of types that should be induced to continue
operations at home, and therefore be motivated to participate in the domestic
regulatory game be Ξ ⊆ Θ, whereas the complementary set (which might be
empty), i.e. those types that should be induced to relocate is Σ. For types in Ξ,
which is to be determined, we restrict attention to piecewise continuously
differentiable mechanisms.
Let )ˆ(T))ˆ(x)ˆ(y(v))ˆ(y(),ˆ(u θθθθθπθθ −−−≡ be net utility or rent achieved
by a θ-firm when announcing its type to be θˆ . Optimising at points of
differentiability yields a first-order condition (IC1) and a local second-order
condition (IC2) for incentive compatibility, both necessary for truthful revelation;
i.e. θθ =ˆ , as given by
(IC1)  0=−−⋅−′−⋅′ θ
θ
θ
θ
θ
θθθθθ
θ
θθπ
d
)(dT)
d
)(dx
d
)(dy())(x)(y(v
d
)(dy))(y(
(IC2)  [ ] 0≥⋅′′+′−⋅′′⋅ θ
θθθ
θ
θθ
d
)(dyv)(yv
d
)(dxv)(y
These conditions are sufficient for truthtelling for any Ξθ∈ ; hence we can
conclude that for any ,)ˆ,( Ξθθ ∈  we have ),ˆ(u),(u)(U θθθθθ ≥≡ . For any
allocation that obeys (IC1) and (IC2), rent accruing to a firm has to obey
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
 (A-2) ),y~(R)(U,anyFor θθΣθ =∈
For types of the firm that should be induced to relocate, rent will be equal to the
firm’s outside option. On the other hand, for those types that should be motivated
to continue operations at home, rent cannot fall below the value of the outside
opportunity, and must be declining in θ so as to ensure truthtelling. (As noted in
the text, the outside option, and hence the participation constraint, is type-
dependent, and, by assumption, non-decreasing in θ.) Note also that a set of
sufficient conditions for (IC2) to hold is that the emission path is non-decreasing
and the output path is non-increasing on Ξ.
Appendix B
• The solution to [RP] in section 3
We’ll solve this problem in two stages: First, find the set of optimal control
variables, and the associated state variable, that solves the problem [RP] for some
fixed value of ξ in the interior of Θ. Then we detemine the optimal cut-off type.
We will ignore the second-order condition (IC2) when solving this problem. (This
seems to be a drastic shortcut, but intuitively there is sufficient concavity in the
problem so as to justify it.)
For some fixed ),( θθξ∈ , let the solution to the sub-problem in (B-1) below be
denoted { )(U),(y),(x θθθ 000 }; where
[ ] −
ξ
θ
θθθγθθθ d)(f)(U))(y),(x,(Smax )y,x(
s.t.
(B-1) [ ]y~,y 0∈  and [ ]y,x θ0∈  for any Ξθ∈
))(x)(y(v)(y)(U θθθθθ −′⋅−=
),y~(R)(U,freeis)(U ξξθ ≥
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In this problem (x, y) is the pair of control variables, U is a continuous state
variable whereas )(θλ  is the costate variable in the Hamiltonian of the problem,
as given by:
(B-2) [ ] )xy(vy)(fU)y,x,(S),U,y,x,(H −′−−= θλθγθλθ
The costate variable has to obey:





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ξξξλ
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θγθλ
000
03

(We can immediately conclude that )(F)( θγθλ = , with ),y~(R)(U ξξ =0 .)
Suppose that for any )y~,(y 0∈  and for any Ξθ∈ , we have that
(B-4) 00 <′′+′− )(vy)(f)y(D γθθ
This condition will, along with our previous assumptions, be sufficient for any
pair (x, y) that jointly satisfies
(B-5)
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in the interior of the control regions; )y,(x θ0∈  and ).y~,(y 0∈
(If we could have established that the Hamiltonian is jointly concave in (x, y, U)
for any θ∈Ξ, then the candidate obeying (B-5) will, according to the Mangasarian
sufficiency theorem, be optimal; see Theorem 4 in chapter 2 in Seierstad and
Sydsæter (1987). If strict concavity of H could be assured, then we would have a
unique optimal solution.) For this property to hold, one is normally forced to
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impose some very restrictive assumptions. It can be verified that a sufficient
condition for H to be strictly concave in (x, y, U) is
(B-6) )xy(v)x(D −′′≥′′ θγ2
which we’ll expect not to hold for y close to the upper bound y~  and x close to
zero, for 0>γ . (For γ  close to zero, (B-6) will trivially hold.)
Further examination of the properties of the Hamiltonian will convince us, for
some given cut-off type ξ, that a unique optimal solution { )(U),(y),(x θθθ 000 }
will exist, with 0x  and 0y  in the interior of each control region, so that (A-1) as
well as (B-5) will be satisfied for { )(U),(y),(x θθθ 000 }.
However, there is one qualifier. The candidate must obey (IC2). Because it is a
rather tedious task to check whether (IC2) will be satisfied or the sufficient
conditions for (IC2) to hold, we assume rather drastically that the emission path,
)(x ⋅0 , is increasing and the output path, )(y ⋅0 , is declining throughout Ξ . (This
is not very drastic when γ  is close to zero. However, if the marginal cost of
public funds is high along with a high foreign ownership share, the claim that
(IC2) will hold might be too restrictive. If (IC2) should not be satsified, we might
end up with a solution involving some bunching, which is beyond the scope of the
present paper.)
Given { }Ξθθθ ∈∀);(y),(x 00  which obeys (B-5), as well as (IC2) and (A-1),
we can now define the maximal value of the integral in (B-1) as )(w ξ , as given by
  θθθθθθ
θ
θγθθθξ
ξ
θ
d)(f))(x)(y(v)(y
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(B-10)
),y~(R)(F ξξγ−
where we have used the state equation and the binding end-point constraint, so as
to get:
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The optimal cut-off type, 0ξ , for some given foreign ownership share, is then
found as the solution to the following stage-two problem:
Optimal cut-off: 

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θ
ξ
Θξ θθθαξξ d)(f),y~(R)(w:)(GMax
According to condition (5) in the text, we have θξ >0 . Hence we have:
011 0000 ≥−′=′− )(f),y~(R)(w)(G)B( ξξαξξ   with 00 ≥′= )(Gif θθξ
On using (B-10), we find that the optimal cut-off type has to obey
(B-11)’ [ ] 0000000000
0
00 ≥′−−′⋅− )(c))(x)(y(v)(y
)(f
)(F)(W ξξξξξξ
ξγξ
where ),y~(R)m())(y),(x,(S:)(W 00000000 1 ξξξξξ +−=
We have assumed that the optimal cut-off type is in the interior of Θ, because the
outside option for types in the upper part of the distribution, as well as the cost of
leaving rent for types that do not relocate will become sufficiently high. Hence,
from a welfare point of view, the society will be better off by letting types in the
upper part of the distribution to leave.
Appendix C
• The impact of higher foreign ownership share (section 4)
The first-order condition for an interior solution of the cut-off type, (B-11), be
written as 0
0
=
∂
∂
ξ
αξ );(G , with 02
2
<
∂
∂
ξ
G  in the neighbourhood of the optimal cut-
off type. (If we in addition to our previous assumptions suppose that ),y~(R ξ  is
weakly convex in ,ξ  then );(G αξ  is strictly concave in ξ . Note that the
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convexity of R is not necessary for G being strictly concave.) Hence we can write
the cut-off type as a differentiable function of the domestic ownership shareα ;
i.e. )(αξξ =0 . Because we have
(C-1) 0
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increasing in α.
• Comparative Statics (section 4)
Let us rewrite the first-order conditions in (B-5) so that 
)(f
j
H
:h j θ
∂
∂
= , for j = x, y;
and suppose that the Hamiltonian is concave in the neighbourhood of )y,x( 00  for
any Ξθ ∈ , with )y,y(y *c∈0 . On differentiating (B-5), we then get
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If we ignore some “pathological” cases, we can restrict attention to situations
where the direct effects dominate leaving the expression in (C-2) to be non-
positive, whereas the expression in (C-3) is non-negative.
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